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Quantum game theory is a new interdisciplinary field between game theory and physical research. In this
paper, we extend the classical inspection game into a quantum game version by quantizing the strategy space
and importing entanglement between players. Our result shows that the quantum inspection game has various
Nash equilibrium depending on the initial quantum state of the game. It is also shown that quantization
can respectively help each player to increase his own payoff, yet fails to bring Pareto improvement for the
collective payoff in the quantum inspection game.
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Game theory is one of the most importance
tools to research the human behavior and its
potential on various myriad subjects. As a re-
cently developing field of game theory, quan-
tum games exhibit many new features which
are greatly different from their classical coun-
terparts. The Marinatto-Weber scheme provides
a straightforward way to incorporate quantum
viewpoints with classical game theory. In this
paper, we quantize the inspection game based on
the Marinatto-Weber scheme to explore whether
the quantization could increase not only individ-
ual but also collective payoff, without decreasing
the interests of others. The results show that this
type of quantum treatment is just able to enhance
each player’s payoff, but can not realize a Pareto
improvement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory, founded by von Neumann and
Morgenstern1 in 1940s, is a mathematical framework to
explain and address the interactive decision situations,
where the aims, goals and preferences of the participat-
ing agents are potentially in conflict. A solution to a
game, which is self enforcing and where no player has
an incentive to deviate from the present strategy unilat-
erally, forms the so-called Nash equilibrium (NE)2. For
example, in a two-person game, a combination of each
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player’s strategy (s∗1, s
∗
2) is a NE if
u1(s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u1(s1, s
∗
2), ∀s1 ∈ S1,
u2(s
∗
1, s
∗
2) ≥ u2(s
∗
1, s2), ∀s2 ∈ S2,
(1)
where the payoffs of two players are determined by func-
tions u1(s1, s2) and u2(s1, s2), respectively. Through the
development of several decades, game theory has gradu-
ally become one of the most importance tools to research
the human behavior and its potential on various myriad
subjects3–19.
Recently, an important breakthrough of game theory
is closely related with quantum information theory20.
In particular, physicists have explored the quantization
of games and presented quantum games and quantum
strategies. For example, when classical framework of
games was incorporated with the quantum viewpoints,
Eisert et al. used quantum approaches to deal with the
prisoner’s dilemma and realized Pareto efficiency where
it is impossible to make one party better off without
making someone worse off21. Meyer found that a player
who implemented a quantum strategy could increase his
expected payoff by using a PQ penny flipover game22.
Furthermore, a lot of research works have proven that
quantum games are greatly different from their classi-
cal counterparts23–31, which thus indicates that quantum
games open up a new way to study the dilemmas in the
classical game theory.
In this paper, we investigate the inspection game, and
extend it into a quantum version. The inspection game32
is a useful metaphor to describe the relationship between
two individuals who have conflicting interest33. In its
basic version, one player chooses to inspect or not, the
other chooses to comply or not. Since both players have
conflict of interest, the game has a mixed-strategy NE
that is not a Pareto efficiency. Here we quantize the in-
spection game to explore whether the quantization could
2increase not only individual but also collective payoff,
without decreasing the interests of others. The results
show that this type of quantum treatment is just able to
enhance each player’s payoff, but can not realize a Pareto
improvement.
II. INSPECTION GAME
Inspection game was first proposed by Dresher32 to de-
scribe the interactions between two agents with conflicts
of interest, such as inspector and smuggler, employer and
worker. Following generalization description of inspec-
tion game33–35, there are an employer, who can either
inspect (I ) or not (N ), and a worker, who can either
work (W ) or shirk (S ). As illustrated in the payoff matrix
(see Eq. (2)), the row (column) player denotes employer
(worker). The employer bears a cost of h from inspect-
ing, and pays the worker a wage of w unless he finds that
the worker is shirking. The worker bears a work-related
cost g, and creates an wealth v for the employer if he
works. It is assumed that all variables are positive and
v > g, w > h, w > g. Obviously, the joint payoff is maxi-
mized when the worker works and the employer does not
inspect.
W S
I
N
(
(v − w − h,w − g) (−h, 0)
(v − w,w − g) (−w,w)
)
.
(2)
For the above payoff matrix (Eq. 2), there does not
exist a pure-strategy NE due to v − w > v − w − h,
−h > −w, w−g > 0 and w > w−g. But it has a mixed-
strategy NE where the employer inspects with probability
p = g/w and the worker works with probability q = 1 −
h/w. In this equilibrium the employer gets a payoff $¯A =
v − w − hv/w, the worker receives a payoff $¯B = w − g,
and the joint payoff is $¯A+B = v−c−hv/w. To illustrate
this point, let us consider the following example35:
v = 60, g = 15, h = 8, w = 20. (3)
Then the payoff matrix (Eq. 2) takes the form
W S
I
N
(
(32, 5) (−8, 0)
(40, 5) (−20, 20)
)
.
(4)
It is clear that there is no pure-strategy NE in this game.
Now let us check its mixed-strategy NE. We assume that
the employer inspects with probability p and the worker
works with probability q. The expected payoff of each
player is defined as
$¯i(p, q) = pqEi(I,W ) + p(1− q)Ei(I, S)
+(1− p)qEi(N,W ) + (1− p)(1 − q)Ei(N,S),
(5)
where Ei(s1, s2) is player i’s payoff for strategy s1 against
strategy s2 of his opponent. So, for employer A and
worker B, their expected payoffs are{
$¯A(p, q) = 12p+ 60q − 20pq − 20,
$¯B(p, q) = 20pq − 15q − 20p+ 20.
(6)
If there does exist a mixed-strategy NE, this equilibrium
can be found by calculating ∂$¯A(p,q)
∂p
= 0 and ∂$¯B(p,q)
∂q
=
0. The results are p∗ = 0.75, q∗ = 0.6. It is easy to
demonstrate that (p∗, q∗) is indeed a mixed-strategy NE
because {
$¯A(p
∗, q∗) ≥ $¯A(p, q
∗), ∀p ∈ [0, 1],
$¯B(p
∗, q∗) ≥ $¯B(p
∗, q), ∀q ∈ [0, 1].
(7)
In this NE, the expected payoffs of employer A and
worker B are $¯∗A = 16, $¯
∗
B = 5, respectively. And the
joint payoff is $¯∗A+B = 21.
III. QUANTUM INSPECTION GAME
Up to the present, there have been several scenar-
ios, for example Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein scheme21 and
Marinatto-Weber scheme23, to quantize the classical
strategy space. In this section, we will follow Marinatto-
Weber version to quantize the strategy space for inspec-
tion game.
Let us define a four-dimensional Hilbert space H for
the inspection game by giving its orthonormal basis vec-
tors H = HA⊗HB = {|IW 〉 , |IS〉 , |NW 〉 , |NS〉}, where
the first qubit is reserved for the state of employer A and
the second one for that of worker B. We assume that
these two players, employer A and worker B, share the
following quantum state:
|ψin〉 = a |IW 〉+ b |IS〉+ c |NW 〉+ d |NS〉 , (8)
where |a|2 + |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2 = 1. According to state
vector |ψin〉, the associated density matrix can be derived
as ρin = |ψin〉 〈ψin|.
Let C be a unitary and Hermitian operator (i.e., such
that C† = C = C−1), such that
C |I〉 = |N〉 , C |N〉 = |I〉 , C |W 〉 = |S〉 , C |S〉 = |W 〉 .
(9)
In the interaction process, employer A does nothing with
probability p by using identity operator I , and acts as
operator C on the first qubit with probability 1−p. Anal-
ogously, worker B does nothing with probability q and
performs C on the second qubit with probability 1 − q.
Then, the final density matrix for this two-qubit quan-
tum system takes the form
ρfin = pq
[
(IA ⊗ IB)ρin(I
†
A ⊗ I
†
B)
]
+p(1− q)
[
(IA ⊗ CB)ρin(I
†
A ⊗ C
†
B)
]
+(1− p)q
[
(CA ⊗ IB)ρin(C
†
A ⊗ I
†
B)
]
+(1− p)(1 − q)
[
(CA ⊗ CB)ρin(C
†
A ⊗ C
†
B)
]
.
(10)
3In order to calculate the payoff, two payoff operators
are introduced as
PA = EA(I,W ) |IW 〉 〈IW |+ EA(I, S) |IS〉 〈IS|
+EA(N,W ) |NW 〉 〈NW |+ EA(N,S) |NS〉 〈NS| ,
(11)
PB = EB(I,W ) |IW 〉 〈IW |+ EB(I, S) |IS〉 〈IS|
+EB(N,W ) |NW 〉 〈NW |+ EB(N,S) |NS〉 〈NS| .
(12)
Finally, the payoff functions of A and B can be obtained
as mean values of these operators
$¯A(p, q) = Tr(PAρfin), $¯B(p, q) = Tr(PBρfin). (13)
As shown above, we successfully build quantum inspec-
tion game based on Marinatto-Weber scheme. Next, it
is of interest to inspect the impact of quantization on
the inspection game. For simplicity, we specify the pay-
off matrix of inspection game as Eq. (4), which has been
considered in the above section.
According to Eqs. (4) and (8)-(13), the expected payoff
functions for both players can be rewritten as follows
$¯A(p, q) = p[q(20|b|
2 + 20|c|2 − 20|a|2 − 20|d|2)
+(12|a|2 − 12|c|2 + 8|d|2 − 8|b|2)]
+q(60|a|2 − 60|b|2 + 40|c|2 − 40|d|2)
+(40|b|2 − 20|a|2 − 8|c|2 + 32|d|2),
$¯B(p, q) = q[p(20|a|
2 − 20|b|2 − 20|c|2 + 20|d|2)
+(15|b|2 − 15|a|2 + 5|c|2 − 5|d|2)]
+p(20|c|2 − 20|a|2)
+(20|a|2 + 5|b|2 + 5|d|2).
(14)
A NE (p∗, q∗) can be obtained by imposing the follow-
ing two conditions:
$¯A(p
∗, q∗)− $¯A(p, q
∗) =
(p∗ − p)[q∗(20|b|2 + 20|c|2 − 20|a|2 − 20|d|2)
+(12|a|2 − 12|c|2 + 8|d|2 − 8|b|2)] ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1],
$¯B(p
∗, q∗)− $¯B(p
∗, q) =
(q∗ − q)[p∗(20|a|2 − 20|b|2 − 20|c|2 + 20|d|2)
+(15|b|2 − 15|a|2 + 5|c|2 − 5|d|2)] ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ [0, 1].
(15)
According to inequalities (15), we can find the required
condition for any possible NE. There are five cases.
Case 1: let (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) be a NE. Let us
consider a case of (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) and find the conditions
of it being a NE. In such a case, the conditions shown in
inequalities (15) translate to
$¯A(1, 1)− $¯A(p, 1) =
(1− p)(12|b|2 + 8|c|2 − 8|a|2 − 12|d|2) ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1],
$¯B(1, 1)− $¯B(1, q) =
(1− q)(5|a|2 − 5|b|2 − 15|c|2 + 15|d|2) ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ [0, 1].
(16)
The inequalities (16) require
C1


−2|a|2 + 3|b|2 + 2|c|2 − 3|d|2 ≥ 0,
|a|2 − |b|2 − 3|c|2 + 3|d|2 ≥ 0,
|a|2 + |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2 = 1.
(17)
The above conditions C1 holds for example, when
|a|2 = 0.6, |b|2 = 0.4, |c|2 = |d|2 = 0. In this case of
(p∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) being a NE, the corresponding payoff
functions are found as follows:{
$¯A(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) = 32|a|2 − 8|b|2 + 40|c|2 − 20|d|2,
$¯B(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) = 5|a|2 + 5|c|2 + 20|d|2.
(18)
According to condition C1 and Eqs. (18), the range of
each payoff can be found easily.

$¯A(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) ∈ [−14, 19.333],
$¯B(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) ∈ [2.5, 10.625],
$¯A+B(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) ∈ [−6, 22.667].
(19)
These results show that either the payoff of each player or
two players’ joint payoff could increase in the quantum in-
spection game. Moreover, from Eqs. (19), the maximum
joint payoff is 22.667. Recalling the classical inspection
game, we find that it has a unique NE where $¯∗A = 16,
$¯∗B = 5 and $¯
∗
A+B = 21. A key question becomes whether
the increase of joint payoff in quantum inspection game
results from the simultaneous increase of each player’s
payoff. If yes, the quantum version of inspection game
definitely outperforms the classical one because it car-
ries out a Pareto improvement. We give the following
optimization problem to answer this question:
max $¯A+B(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) =
$¯A(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) + $¯B(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 1)
s.t.


$¯A(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) ≥ 16,
$¯B(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) ≥ 5,
−2|a|2 + 3|b|2 + 2|c|2 − 3|d|2 ≥ 0,
|a|2 − |b|2 − 3|c|2 + 3|d|2 ≥ 0,
|a|2 + |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2 = 1.
(20)
For the optimization problem of Eq. (20), the maximum
of object function is 21 when |a|2 = 0.45, |b|2 = 0.3, |c|2 =
0.15, |d|2 = 0.1, at that situation $A(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) = 16
and $¯B(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 1) = 5. Therefore, in this case,
the quantum inspection game increases either the payoff
of employer A or the payoff of worker B, but can not
simultaneously increase the payoffs ofA and B, compared
with the equilibrium of classical inspection game. That
is to say, the quantum inspection game does not carry
out a Pareto improvement.
Case 2: let (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) be a NE. Let us
examine another case of (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) and find the
conditions of it being a NE. In such a case, the conditions
shown in inequalities (15) translate to
$¯A(0, 0)− $¯A(p, 0) =
p(12|c|2 − 12|a|2 + 8|b|2 − 8|d|2) ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1],
$¯B(0, 0)− $¯B(0, q) =
q(15|a|2 − 15|b|2 − 5|c|2 + 5|d|2) ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ [0, 1].
(21)
The inequalities (21) require
C2


−3|a|2 + 2|b|2 + 3|c|2 − 2|d|2 ≥ 0,
3|a|2 − 3|b|2 − |c|2 + |d|2 ≥ 0,
|a|2 + |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2 = 1.
(22)
4The above conditions C2 hold, for example, when
|a|2 = 0.4375, |b|2 = 0.375, |c|2 = 0.1875, |d|2 = 0. In
this case of (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) being a NE, the correspond-
ing payoff functions are found as follows:
{
$¯A(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) = 40|b|2 − 20|a|2 − 8|c|2 + 32|d|2,
$¯B(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) = 20|a|2 + 5|b|2 + 5|d|2.
(23)
According to conditions C2 and Eqs. (23), the range
of each payoff in this case is


$¯A(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) ∈ [−14, 19.333],
$¯B(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) ∈ [2.5, 10.625],
$¯A+B(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) ∈ [−6, 22.667].
(24)
These results are identical with the case of (p∗ =
1, q∗ = 1). Similarly, we examine if there exists possible
Pareto improvement based on the following optimization
equation
max $¯A+B(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) =
$¯A(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) + $¯B(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 0)
s.t.


$¯A(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) ≥ 16,
$¯B(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) ≥ 5,
−3|a|2 + 2|b|2 + 3|c|2 − 2|d|2 ≥ 0,
3|a|2 − 3|b|2 − |c|2 + |d|2 ≥ 0,
|a|2 + |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2 = 1.
(25)
For Eq. (25), the maximum of object function is 21 when
|a|2 = 0.1, |b|2 = 0.15, |c|2 = 0.3, |d|2 = 0.45, at that
situation $A(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) = 16 and $¯B(p
∗ = 0, q∗ =
0) = 5. Therefore, in this case of (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 0) being a
NE, the quantum inspection game still does not carry out
a Pareto improvement compared with the NE of classical
inspection game.
Case 3: let (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 0) be a NE. Now let us
consider the case of (p∗ = 1, q∗ = 0) to find the conditions
of it being a NE. In this case, the conditions shown in
inequalities (15) translate to
$¯A(1, 0)− $¯A(p, 0) =
(1− p)(12|a|2 − 8|b|2 − 12|c|2 + 8|d|2) ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1],
$¯B(1, 0)− $¯B(1, q) =
q(−5|a|2 + 5|b|2 + 15|c|2 − 15|d|2) ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ [0, 1].
(26)
The inequalities (26) require
C3


3|a|2 − 2|b|2 − 3|c|2 + 2|d|2 ≥ 0,
−|a|2 + |b|2 + 3|c|2 − 3|d|2 ≥ 0.
|a|2 + |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2 = 1.
(27)
Conditions C3 hold, for example, when |a|2 = 0.75,
|b|2 = 0, |c|2 = 0.25, |d|2 = 0. In this case of (p∗ =
1, q∗ = 0) being a NE, the corresponding payoff functions
are shown as follows:{
$¯A(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 0) = 32|b|2 − 8|a|2 − 20|c|2 + 40|d|2,
$¯B(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 0) = 5|b|2 + 20|c|2 + 5|d|2.
(28)
Based on condition C3 and Eqs. (28), we can verify
that the range of each payoff is completely same with
that of above cases, namely


$¯A(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 0) ∈ [−14, 19.333],
$¯B(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 0) ∈ [2.5, 10.625],
$¯A+B(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 0) ∈ [−6, 22.667].
(29)
Similarly, we find that in this case of (p∗ = 1, q∗ =
0) being a NE, the quantum version of inspection game
is still not able to implement a Pareto improvement on
the mixed-strategy NE of classical inspection game. The
maximum joint payoff of A and B is 21 when |a|2 = 0.3,
|b|2 = 0.45, |c|2 = 0.1, |d|2 = 0.15, at the same time
$A(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 0) = 16 and $¯B(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 0) = 5.
Case 4: let (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 1) be a NE. Let us explore
the case of (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 1) being a NE. In such a case,
the conditions shown in inequalities (15) translate to
$¯A(0, 1)− $¯A(p, 1) =
p(8|a|2 − 12|b|2 − 8|c|2 + 12|d|2) ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1],
$¯B(0, 1)− $¯B(0, q) =
(1− q)(15|b|2 − 15|a|2 + 5|c|2 − 5|d|2) ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ [0, 1].
(30)
The inequalities (30) require
C4


2|a|2 − 3|b|2 − 2|c|2 + 3|d|2 ≥ 0,
−3|a|2 + 3|b|2 + |c|2 − |d|2 ≥ 0,
|a|2 + |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2 = 1.
(31)
The condition C4 holds, for example, when |a|2 =
|c|2 = 0, |b|2 = |d|2 = 0.5. In this case of (p∗ = 0, q∗ = 1)
being a NE, the corresponding payoff functions are shown
as follows:
{
$¯A(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 1) = 40|a|2 − 20|b|2 + 32|c|2 − 8|d|2,
$¯B(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 1) = 5|a|2 + 20|b|2 + 5|c|2.
(32)
Depending on condition C4 and Eqs. (32), we can ob-
tain the range of each payoff


$¯A(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 1) ∈ [−14, 19.333],
$¯B(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 1) ∈ [2.5, 10.625],
$¯A+B(p
∗ = 0, q∗ = 1) ∈ [−6, 22.667].
(33)
In this case, we find that there is still not Pareto im-
provement even adopting the quantum inspection game.
The maximum joint payoff of A and B, which equals to
21, is calculated when |a|2 = 0.15, |b|2 = 0.1, |c|2 = 0.45,
|d|2 = 0.3, and $A(p
∗ = 1, q∗ = 0) = 16, $¯B(p
∗ = 1, q∗ =
0) = 5.
Case 5: let (p∗, q∗) be a mixed-strategy NE. In
this case, we first consider the situation of p∗, q∗ ∈ (0, 1).
For p∗ and q∗ differing from 0 or 1, the inequalities (15)
are required to be satisfied. Since the factors (p∗−p) and
(q∗ − q) may be positive or negative for different values
of p and q, the only way of fulfilling conditions shown
in inequalities (15) is to make the coefficients of (p∗ − p)
5and (q∗ − q) become zero. So, the NE can be obtained
as follows
p∗ = 3|a|
2−3|b|2−|c|2+|d|2
4|a|2−4|b|2−4|c|2+4|d|2 ,
q∗ = 3|a|
2−2|b|2−3|c|2+2|d|2
5|a|2−5|b|2−5|c|2+5|d|2 .
(34)
The above mixed-strategy NE is constrained by several
self-evident conditions denoted as C5: (i) p∗, q∗ ∈ (0, 1);
(ii) |a|2 + |b|2 + |c|2 + |d|2 = 1. According to the pair of
p∗ and q∗, the payoff functions become


$¯A(p
∗, q∗) =
16|a|4−16|b|4−16|c|4+16|d|4+12|a|2|d|2−12|b|2|c|2
|a|2−|b|2−|c|2+|d|2 ,
$¯B(p
∗, q∗) =
5|a|4−5|b|4−5|c|4+5|d|4+20|a|2|d|2−20|b|2|c|2
|a|2−|b|2−|c|2+|d|2 .
(35)
Likewise, the bound of each payoff is found as


$¯A(p
∗, q∗) ∈ [11, 16],
$¯B(p
∗, q∗) ∈ [5, 7.5],
$¯A+B(p
∗, q∗) ∈ [18.5, 21].
(36)
It is clear that there is not Pareto improvement in
the quantum inspection game because the maximin joint
payoff of A and B does not exceed 21. On the con-
trary, in this case the import of quantization decreases
the collective payoff of all players. Moreover, the pay-
off of employer A never exceeds 16, and payoff of worker
B is always above 5. Different from above mentioned
cases, the present case (namely, (p∗, q∗) being a NE where
p∗, q∗ ∈ (0, 1)) is definitely beneficial for worker B and
harmful for employer A, compared with the classical in-
spection game.
In addition, a mixed-strategy NE may also be (p∗, 0),
(p∗, 1), (0, q∗) or (1, q∗), where p∗, q∗ ∈ (0, 1). For these
cases, we have examined these possibilities one by one,
and still find that Pareto improvement did not occur.
IV. NASH EQUILIBRIUMS OF SOME TYPICAL
QUANTUM STATES
To illustrate the features of quantum inspection game,
some typical quantum states need to be set as initial
states. In this section, we will provided some examples,
which are helpful to further understand the quantum ver-
sion of inspective game.
Example 1: |ψin〉 = |IW 〉.
Let |a|2 = 1, |b|2 = |c|2 = |d|2 = 0, a simple initial
state |ψin〉 = |IW 〉 is obtained. According to quantum
mechanics definition, this state is a factorizable quantum
state. Based on Eqs (8) - (15), the NE of this game
is readily found: it has a unique NE (p∗ = 0.75, q∗ =
0.6); and the payoff of each player is $¯A(0.75, 0.6) = 16,
$¯B(0.75, 0.6) = 5, which are identical with the outcomes
of classical inspection game. That is to say, the quantum
game has reproduced the results of classical game theory
in the case of factorizable quantum state.
Example 2: |ψin〉 =
√
1
2 |IW 〉+
√
1
2 |NS〉 or |ψin〉 =√
1
2 |IS〉+
√
1
2 |NW 〉.
These two quantum states |ψin〉 =
√
1
2 |IW 〉 +√
1
2 |NS〉 and |ψin〉 =
√
1
2 |IS〉+
√
1
2 |NW 〉 are known as
Bell states in quantum mechanics, showing that these two
players are entangled in the initial states. In this case,
the quantum inspection game has a same and unique NE
(p∗ = 0.5, q∗ = 0.5), where leads to $¯A(0.5, 0.5) = 11,
$¯B(0.5, 0.5) = 7.5. These results show that worker B
benefits from the entanglement, but employerA does not.
Moreover, the entanglement decreases the joint payoff of
A and B.
Example 3: |ψin〉 =
√
1
2 |IW 〉+
√
1
2 |IS〉.
In this example, the quantum inspection game has
countless NEs denoted as {(1, q∗)|q∗ ∈ [0, 1]}. Payoffs of
players are $¯A(1, q
∗) = 12, $¯B(1, q
∗) = 2.5, ∀q∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Compared with the NE of classical inspection game, both
players’ payoffs have decreased.
Example 4: |ψin〉 =
√
1
2 |NW 〉+
√
1
2 |NS〉.
The results of this example are given as follows, which
is similar to Example 3.
NEs: {(0, q∗)|q∗ ∈ [0, 1]}.
$¯A(0, q
∗) = 12, $¯B(0, q
∗) = 2.5, ∀q∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Example 5: |ψin〉 =
√
1
2 |IW 〉+
√
1
2 |NW 〉.
In this example, the payoff of employer A becomes neg-
ative, and that of worker B is a relatively high value.
NEs: {(p∗, 0)|p∗ ∈ [0, 1]}.
$¯A(p
∗, 0) = −14, $¯B(p
∗, 0) = 10, ∀p∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Example 6: |ψin〉 =
√
1
2 |IS〉+
√
1
2 |NS〉.
Here, similar to Example 5, the payoff of employer A
is always negative, no matter what strategy he takes.
NEs: {(p∗, 1)|p∗ ∈ [0, 1]}.
$¯A(p
∗, 1) = −14, $¯B(p
∗, 1) = 10, ∀p∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Example 7: |ψin〉 =
√
1
4 |IW 〉 +
√
1
4 |IS〉 +√
1
4 |NW 〉+
√
1
4 |NS〉.
In this scenario, the results are shown as follows.
NEs: {(p∗, q∗)|p∗, q∗ ∈ [0, 1]}.
$¯A(p
∗, q∗) = 11, $¯B(p
∗, q∗) = 7.5, ∀p∗, q∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Obviously, this example presents very interesting re-
sults. In this setting of initial quantum state, the strate-
gies of players do not affect the equilibrium of this quan-
tum game. The joint payoff of A and B, which equals to
18.5, is still lower than that of the NE of classical game.
V. SUMMARY
To sum, we have extended the classical inspection
game into a quantum version based on Marinatto-Weber
quantum game model. Different from the unique mixed-
strategy NE of classical inspection game, quantizing this
game and setting a suitable initial quantum state for the
6two-qubit system can lead to either pure-strategy NE or
mixed-strategy NE. Moreover, compared with the clas-
sical inspection game, the quantum form has two main
characteristics. At first, in the quantum inspection game,
either employer or worker has ways to obtain more benefit
than that derived from NE of classical inspection game.
Another character is that the quantization can not bring
Pareto improvement to the classical inspection game. In
the quantum version, the employer or worker who wants
to improve his benefit has to harm the interest of the
other. The results show that there may exist irrecon-
cilable conflict between employer and worker in the in-
spection game, which is different from prisoner’s dilemma
where Pareto efficiency can be carried out by using quan-
tum strategies21. This work sheds a new insight to the
inspection game and quantum game theory.
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